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Today the All England Lawn Tennis Club, hosts of the famous Wimbledon Championships, pledges to be diverse and inclusive. But in 1971 an 18-year-old university student, Hoosen Bobat from Durban, was excluded from achieving his dream of becoming the first black South African to play in the Wimbledon men’s junior tournament. This was due to apartheid, and the collusion of the all-white tennis union in South Africa and the International Lawn Tennis Federation, with Wimbledon toeing the line.

I tell Bobat’s story in the new book Tennis, Apartheid and Social Justice. I am a scholar who has published numerous books and papers on the histories of black exclusion and organised black resistance during apartheid, and on social justice and transformation.

My book documents the historic 1971 first international tour by a squad of black South Africans who played tennis under the auspices of the non-racial Southern African Lawn Tennis Union.

In 1973, the union was a founding affiliate of the South African Council on Sport, which popularised the slogan

No normal sport in an abnormal society.

In the context of apartheid, this must be contrasted with tennis played by white South Africans under the racially exclusively white tennis union.

The 1971 touring players were dubbed the “Dhiraj squad” after tennis champion Jasmat Dhiraj, a school teacher. The other five were Hira Dhiraj, Alwyn Solomon, Oscar Woodman, Cavan Bergman and Bobat.

The union’s goals were for its most promising players to compete in tournaments in Europe irrespective of “race” and nationality, to improve their games and be ambassadors for upholding equity and human dignity in sport.

Read more: The South African Council on Sport at 50: the fight for sports development is still relevant today

I wrote the book because I believe important social justice issues arose from the tour. At a minimum, a public apology is due from the international tennis body and Wimbledon to the non-racial sport community, the 1971 tour players and Bobat.

I also thought it was important to tell the story while most of those who lived through it were were still with us. And the book was also an opportunity to focus on “ordinary” people, on unsung heroes, on their tribulations and triumphs. A focus on everyday histories rather than on dramatic events and on elites.

The issues

In the book I cover three issues.

Firstly, I place the tour within the political, social and sporting conditions under apartheid. In 1971 South Africa was a racist, segregated and repressive society, based on white supremacy and privilege and black subjugation. Black people were denied proper sports facilities, coaching and opportunities to excel, could not belong to the same clubs as whites or compete in competitions with or against white players. Considered subjects, not citizens, they couldn’t represent South Africa in sport. Sport under apartheid was a killing field of ambitions and dreams.

Secondly, it records the players. The tournaments they participated in, their performances and challenges, the tour’s impact on them, the lessons learnt and their lives and tennis accomplishments after 1971.

Thirdly, the book demonstrates the collusion between the International Lawn Tennis Federation and the white South African tennis body. That collusion, and the action of the All England Lawn Tennis Club, prevented Bobat from becoming the first black South African to play in the junior Wimbledon championships.

The arguments

I make five main arguments.

One is that, since democracy in 1994, there has been no fitting recognition, symbolic or material, of outstanding apartheid-era non-racial tennis players. Nor has there been appropriate restitution and reparation of any kind.

A second argument is that apartheid’s legacy continues to profoundly affect and shape tennis today. A walk around the affluent white town of Stellenbosch in the Western Cape province and a black township like KwaMashu near Durban reveals the stark differences in terms of tennis courts, coaching and the like.

Third, probably less tennis is played today in black schools and communities than before democracy. Certainly, there is less self-organisation of the kind that harnessed limited economic and social capital in black communities to ensure non-racial tennis.

Fourth, as in other areas of South African society, there has been much talk about “transformation” but little substantive transformation in tennis.

Fifth, there should have been a Truth and Reconciliation Commission for sport that laid bare apartheid sports crimes, the perpetrators and collaborators, and forged agreement on reparations and transformation.

The collaborators included big business and the media. With the support of the South African sugar industry, the tennis Sugar Circuit became the “breeding ground for world ranked (white South African) players”. The sugar industry was built on the blood and sweat of Indian indentured labour and black labour more generally.

Yet, sugar big business did little to support black players. The commercial media linked to big business were also complicit, devoting print copy and airtime principally to white sports.

Class, racism and patriarchy

Opportunities in tennis were profoundly shaped by class, racism, patriarchy and other factors.

The players in the 1971 tour were classified “Coloured” or “Indian”. There were no “Black” South African players chosen because of a debatable notion of “merit” used by the Southern African Lawn Tennis Union.

And the tour was an exclusively male affair even though there were outstanding women tennis players and well-established women’s tournaments. Charmaine Williams joined the tour at her own expense.

In my study I identify how non-racial tennis officials in South Africa exemplified dominant patriarchal attitudes and didn’t take gender inclusion seriously. This would remain an issue in the South African Council on Sport of the 1970s and 1980s.

Jasmat Dhiraj told me that he had to “overcome inhibitions and complexes” on tour. Bobat states that they

had to overcome the so-called inferiority complex of playing against white tennis players.

Truth and justice

Former South African president and liberation leader Nelson Mandela commented in 1995:

We can now deal with our past, establish the truth which has so long been denied us, and lay the basis for genuine reconciliation. Only the truth can put the past to rest.

But, in my view, instead of dealing with our past South Africans are letting it fester, failing to see that genuine reconciliation cannot be achieved by ignoring the injustices and pain of the past.

Saleem Badat receives funding from the National Institute for Humanities and Social Sciences and the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation.

The global impact of the COVID-19 pandemic has been particularly apparent in sports events. In an attempt to limit the spread of the virus, the world has witnessed the cancellation, postponement or rescheduling of major events: Wimbledon tennis, Euro 2020 football, the Tour De France cycling and the 2020 Tokyo Olympic Games to mention a few.

In a recent study I conducted with David Maralack of the University of Cape Town, we looked at the 2020 cancellation of the popular Two Oceans Marathon in Cape Town, on the south-western coast of South Africa. We wanted to see what lessons about risk and reputational management could be learned from this and the consequent impacts on its many stakeholders.

With a focus on sports management, we interviewed the race director, previous board members and other stakeholders, including members of regional and provincial athletics bodies and provincial government.

The cancellation was managed well under the circumstances, but it also highlighted some areas that could be improved on. It became clear that events that communicate effectively with their community of participants and audiences stand the best chance of weathering a storm.

The marathon

Marathon running is very popular in South Africa and people from all walks of life participate in the many races on offer. An ultramarathon is longer than a traditional 42km marathon. In the case of the Two Oceans, it is 56km. It’s considered one of the most scenic ultramarathons in the world, taking in Table Mountain and the Indian and Atlantic oceans.

What started out in 1970 as a training run for the country’s other premier ultramarathon, the 90km Comrades Marathon, the Two Oceans is now a festival Easter weekend of races. In 2019, the event turned 50 and hosted 34,000 participants, from ultra-marathon to family fun run.

The value of the event to the Cape Town and Western Cape economy is estimated at R672 million. Before the races, a running expo at the Cape Town International Convention Centre receives more than 55,000 visitors over three days. The race costs R30 million to stage and attracts significant media coverage.

However, the 51st Two Oceans, to be held from 8-11 April 2020 was the first marathon to be cancelled in South Africa due to the rapid spread of COVID-19 worldwide. It was also one of the first marathons to be impacted on the global marathon stage.

The cancellation

The decision to cancel an event is not an easy one. This was also not a popular one as it was made by the marathon’s board just three weeks before the event was to start. Significant funding was already spent as the bulk of the planning, logistics and preparation were complete.

The board had to weigh up costs and economic benefits versus massive health-related risks. Also at stake was the event’s reputation, concerns about its sustainability, as well as the athletes not getting refunded.

With 3,000 international participants expected and half the participants coming from outside Cape Town, a key concern was the negative economic impact from the loss of these sports tourists.

Friends and relatives who come to support the runners spend between three and six days in the region – and some up to three weeks in the country. A sport tourism event like this is a key economic driver that also serves to market Cape Town as a destination.

Many stakeholders

Data was analysed for key themes emerging from our interviews. There were many lessons to be learned. The decision to cancel was complex, given all the stakeholders involved.

Organisers monitored global advisories and engaged with other events in a similar situation. They consulted with government departments, approvals agencies, health institutions and universities. Particularly important stakeholders included the race medical team, the city’s events office and the provincial authorities. Sponsors and event partners were consulted ahead of the decision to cancel.

The medical team strongly advised that the marathon couldn’t guarantee the safety of participants. The University of Cape Town, hosting the race finish village, advised they would be closed and not accessible for the event. The university provides professional services as the official race medical team and had a critical voice in responding to the crisis.

Western Province Athletics also played an important role through the national athletics body, Athletics South Africa, liaising with the sports ministry. The sports minister formed part of a national COVID-19 command council. And consideration had to be given to the tourism and investment agencies, sponsors and service providers who had much to lose. These inputs were vital for the board to make the dreaded decision to cancel.

Even before South Africa declared a COVID-19-related state of disaster, Two Oceans felt the risk of continuing far outweighed the benefits. The race was cancelled on 15 March, 12 days after the first case was detected in South Africa.

From an organisational perspective, the cancellation underscores the significance of brand reputation and that the event is only as good as it is because of the support of stakeholders such as runners, clubs, sponsors, suppliers and approvals agencies.

Lessons learned

Management of the cancellation was largely successful in its main aims of protecting people’s health, honouring legal obligations and protecting the brand. Although the final decision was accepted, the organisation recognised that its decision-making and communication needs to be more responsive and agile.

The cancellation drew significant levels of criticism on social media platforms, with runners demanding refunds or that entry fees be deferred. This was not possible as funding had been contractually committed to suppliers. Stakeholders underscored the importance of the marathon being more runner-centric in its communication.

One of the most significant organisational impacts was recognising that the race was not sufficiently safeguarded against disasters, beyond financial considerations only. These would include general advisories on travel and health that could supplement security and race operations.

Due to global health and safety concerns, cancelling was inevitable and the outcomes the best that could have been reached under the circumstances. However, race managers and stakeholders deliberated on what could’ve been done differently.

Looking ahead

Of particular importance is consideration of its primary stakeholder, the runner, and strategic partnership with provincial government and sponsors. Refunds were not possible, but a more reflexive and flexible budgetary process may be necessary to limit negative impacts.

The pandemic has also confronted organisers to consider alternatives, such as virtual races – and consequently to review their traditional approaches to marketing and sponsorships. Consideration of the digital space beyond COVID-19 opens huge possibilities for brands to engage with 35,000 runners over the course of a year instead of just race weekend.

Enhanced health protocols accompanied by effective communication plans will be required from stakeholders. It is also critical that the event works closely with the governing body to enhance information flow and decision-making.

The timeframe for planning the 2021 event is already counting down. In this post-COVID-19 period of uncertainty, various contingencies and permutations need to be considered – driven by a consultative process where all stakeholders have mutual responsibility to ensure the event’s sustainability.

Kamilla Swart is affiliated with the Division of Engineering Management and Decision Sciences, College of Science and Engineering, Hamad Bin Khalifa University, Qatar Foundation, Doha, Qatar and the School of Tourism and Hospitality, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa.